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ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether Judge Sorensen committed reversible error in 
granting hospital's motion for summary judgment because the 
plaintiffs were aware of Mrs, Brower's leg injury and knew or 
should have known that it was possibly caused by hospital's 
negligence, more than two years before commencing this action. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following determinative statutes, rules and 
regulations are set forth in relevant part in the addendum: Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act, U.C.A. §§78-14-4 and 8 (1953 as 
amended) and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a medical malpractice 
action in which plaintiffs-appellants Saundra Brower and Frank 
Oscar Brower ("Browers") seek damages for injuries allegedly 
caused by a puncture wound to Saundra Brower's right leg, which 
allegedly occurred while she was in the recovery room, following 
her hysterectomy in the Valley View Medical Center ("hospital") 
on October 22, 1980. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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B. Proceedings and Disposition Below, Browers1 action 
against the hospital is confined to allegations of damages 
related to the puncture wound in her right leg. On February 21, 
1985, Judge Allen B. Sorensen of the Fifth Judicial District 
Court, Iron County, granted hospital's motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed Browers1 action with prejudice, on the 
grounds that this action was barred by the statute of limitations 
because Browers discovered this injury and the possibility of 
hospital's negligence on October 22, 1980, more than two years 
before filing this action. Browers' motion for partial summary 
judgment that her action was not barred by the statute of 
limitations was denied. (R. at 138). 
C. Statement of Facts. On October 22, 1980, Saundra 
Brower underwent a surgical hysterectomy which was performed by 
co-defendant-respondent Dr. David W. Brown in a hospital 
operating room. Following this surgery, and as Mrs. Brower was 
being taken from the recovery room, she awoke from the 
anesthesia. At this time, she experienced pain in her right 
thigh, just above the knee, which was more severe than any pain 
she had ever had. She immediately began screaming "What did you 
do to my leg? What happened to my leg?" (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 
47-48). 
-2-
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Mrs. Browerfs husband and sister, who were present at 
the time, observed a lot of blood coming from a puncture wound 
five or six inches above her right knee. Mrs. Brower recalls her 
sister commenting that the leg was bleeding and asking what had 
happened. (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 47 and Oscar Brower Dep. p. 18-
20). 
Mrs. Brower was placed in a hospital bed, the puncture 
wound was bandaged and heat was applied. (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 
117). 
After she fully awoke, Mrs. Brower discovered a large 
oval shaped bumpy bruise above her right knee, which was 
approximately two inches wide and four inches long. Mrs. Brower 
also noticed that there was a puncture mark in the center of the 
bruise, "like an injection hole". (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 49, 
124). 
A few hours later, when the anesthesiologist visited 
the room, Mrs. Brower asked what he had done to her leg. The 
anesthesiologist examined the leg and told her "I didn't do 
that", "That wasn't there when you left the operating room" and 
"Whatever happened happened to you in the recovery room." 
(Saundra Brower Dep. p. 50). Mrs. Brower later testified that, 
at this point, she "knew there was a problem" and that "something 
-3-
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had happened that was improper". (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 120-
121). 
Mrs. Brower consulted with her sister and was told that 
when she was being brought from the recovery room "blood was 
spurting from her leg" and that the nurse told her "I don't 
know". (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 117). 
Thereafter, Mrs. Brower "asked everybody" who came to 
care for her for information about the puncture wound. She 
complained to Nurse Condra Lawrencef who responded by checking 
the puncture area. Nurse Lawrence told them that she did not 
know why this had been done. (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 52 and 
Condra Lawrence Dep. p. 14, 19). 
Later this same day, Dr. Brown became available and the 
Browers asked him what had happened. Dr. Brown examined the leg 
and told them "he did not know but he would find out". (Saundra 
Brower Dep. p. 51 and Oscar Brower Dep. p. 21). 
Following this conversation, neither Mrs. Brower nor 
her husband had any further conversations with Dr. Brown 
regarding the puncture wound. Mrs. Brower later testified that 
Dr. Brown never again said anything about her leg. (Saundra 
Brower Dep. p. 53 and Oscar Brower Dep. p. 21). 
On October 28, while still experiencing constant pain 
and a cramping feeling at the site of the puncture wound, Mrs. 
-4-
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Brower was discharged from the hospital. (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 
54). 
On February 16f 1983f almost four months after the two-
year statute of limitations had lapsed, Browers served the 
hospital with a notice of intent to commence this action. (R. at 
1 para 8). 
Browers1 complaint against the hospital was filed on 
June 14, 1983, almost eight months after the limitation period 
had run. Allegations against the hospital are limited to 
negligence and injuries relating to Mrs. Brower1s puncture 
wound. Browers1 complaint does not allege that the hospital 
prevented them from discovering negligence or misconduct or any 
other facts which would extend the two-year statute of 
limitations. (R. at 1). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Browers1 action is barred by the statute of limitations 
because they discovered the injury and the possibility of 
hospital's negligence on October 22, 1980, more than two years 
before filing this action. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-14-4 cuts off all medical 
malpractice claims not brought within two years after a plaintiff 
discovers or should have discovered an injury. This Court has 
consistently ruled that an injury is deemed to have been 
-5-
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discovered and the statute of limitations begins to run when a 
plaintiff discovers the fact of the injury and the possibility 
that it may have been caused by negligence. Certainty of 
causation and negligence is not required and the injury need not 
be catastrophic for the statute to begin to run. Regardless of 
whether a plaintiff has conferred with experts, the statute of 
limitations begins to run at the time one knows or should know of 
an injury and the possibility of negligence. 
Judge Sorensen's judgment below was based upon the 
Browers1 own uncontradicted testimony thatf over two years before 
commencing this action, they knew that Mrs. Brower's leg had been 
injured in the recovery room and believed that something 
"improper" had happened. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BROWERS1 ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
BECAUSE THEY DISCOVERED THEIR LEGAL INJURY ON OCTOBER 
22, 1980f MORE THAN TWO YEARS BEFORE FILING THIS 
ACTION. 
A. The Statute of Limitations Began to Run On October 22, 
1980, When Browers Became Aware of Their Injury and the 
Possibility of Hospital's Negligence. 
Browers1 claim was not commenced within two years 
following their discovery that they had a possible cause of 
action against the hospital. Consequently, their claim is 
-6-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
forever barred. Utah Code Annotated §§78-14-4 cuts off all 
medical malpractice claims not brought within two years after a 
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered a possible cause of 
action. This statutory limitation period states in pertinent 
part that: 
No malpractice action against a health 
care provider may be brought unless it 
is commenced within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury, which-
ever first occurs,. . . 
U.C.A. §78-14-4 (Supp. 1981.) 
Thus, a plaintiff's cause of action accrues, and the statute of 
limitations begins to run, when the plaintiff "discovers the 
injury" and the action is barred two years from that date. The 
leading pronouncement of the Utah Supreme Court on what consti-
tutes discovery of the injury is Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 
(Utah 1979). 
In Foil the court ruled that "the statute begins to run 
when an injured person knows or should know that he has suffered 
a legal injury" Id. at 147. Discovery of a "legal injury" means 
that the plaintiff must have discovered both the fact of the 
injury and the possibility that the injury may have been caused 
by the negligence of the health care provider. Reiser v. Lohner, 
641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Precise certainty of causation and negligence is not 
required for a cause of action to accrue. Rather, the discovery 
of causation and negligence may be either actual or presump-
tive. It is sufficient if the plaintiff is on inquiry notice of 
a possible cause of action or should know of the defendant's 
possible negligence. See Massey v. Litton, 669 P.2d 248, 251 
(Nev. 1983) (adopting the Foil rule that the limitation period 
begins to run when the plaintiff is on "inquiry notice" of a 
possible cause of action) and Anderson v. Shook, 333 N.W.2d 708, 
712 (N.D. 1983) (holding that a medical malpractice statute 
begins to run when the plaintiff knows or should know of a 
defendant's "possible negligence"). 
In Foil, the court found that, because the plaintiff 
had a history of back injuries, prior to the defendant's 
negligent treatment, the plaintiff did not know and could not 
have known that defendant's negligent treatment caused additional 
injury. Unlike the plaintiff in Foil, Browers were aware of both 
the injury and the possibility that it had been caused by 
hospital's negligence. 
The Browers' own testimony establishes that on October 
22, 1980, the date of surgery, they were aware that Mrs. Brower's 
right thigh had been injured because something "improper" had 
happened. 
-8-
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B. On October 22, 1980, More Than Two Years Before Filing 
This Action, Browers Knew of Their Injury and Knew or 
Should Have Known that it was Possibly Caused by 
Hospital's Negligence. 
Saundra Brower and her husband both testified that on 
October 22, 1980, they discovered that Mrs. Brower's thigh had 
been injured. During her deposition, Mrs. Brower said that, as 
she was being taken from the recovery room, she awoke from the 
anesthesia and experienced pain in her right thigh which was more 
severe than any pain which she could remember. Mrs. Brower's 
husband and sister were both present at the time and observed 
that there was a lot of blood coming from a puncture wound five 
or six inches above the right knee. Mrs. Brower further 
testified that when she fully awoke she discovered a large oval 
shaped bumpy bruise approximately two inches wide and four inches 
long. She also noted that there was a puncture mark in the 
center of the bruise "like an injection hole". (Saundra Brower 
Dep. p. 47-49, 117, 124). 
Mrs. Brower admitted that because her operation had 
nothing to do with her leg, she and her husband were 
suspicious. As a result, Mrs. Brower confronted the 
< 
anesthesiologist and asked what he had done to her leg. He 
denied having done anything and indicated that the injury wasn't 
there when she had left the operating room and that whatever 
1 
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happened must have taken place in the recovery room. Mrs. Brower 
testified, that, at this point, she and her husband knew that 
there was a problem and that something had happened that was 
improper. (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 50, 120-121). 
Mrs. Brower testified that, thereafter, she asked 
everyone who came to care for her for information concerning the 
puncture wound. Nurse Condra Lawrence examined the wound and 
told the Browers she did not know why this had been done. Dr. 
Brown told the Browers that he did not know what had happened but 
would find out. He never said anything further about the 
injury. The Browers both testified that, thereafter, they tried 
many times to find out what happened. (Oscar Brower Dep. p. 21 
and Saundra Brower Dep. p. 51-53). 
By their own testimony, Browers knew or at least should 
have known, on October 22, 1980, that Saundra Browerfs puncture 
wound was possibly caused by hospital's negligence. The Browers 
and their counsel have conceded the obviousness of this 
conclusion by alleging that res ipsa loquitur is applicable and 
that the puncture wound "would not have occurred without the 
negligence of someone." (R. at 1. para. 26). 
Although Judge Sorensen's order of dismissal is based 
upon the Browers1 own uncontradicted testimony, Browers1 brief 
suggests several reasons why the order was not appropriate. 
-10-
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Browers1 brief claims, for the first time, that the hospital 
suppressed evidence of misconduct, thereby tolling the running of 
the limitation period. Their complaint contains no such 
allegation and the record below fails to support this eleventh 
hour speculation. The mere fact that the complaint omits such an 
allegation is sufficient to bar Browers from relying on the 
"fraudulent concealment" extension to the statute of 
limitations. See U.C.A. §78-14-4(b) (1953 as amended). 
Browers next claim that Dr. Brown's failure to discuss 
the leg injury or to give some explanation for its cause, misled 
them into thinking that it was an unavoidable consequence of the 
hysterectomy. This argument is contrary to the Browers' own 
testimony. Mrs. Brower testified thatf because the leg injury 
did not appear to be related to the hysterectomy, she thought 
that perhaps some additional surgery had been performed, and 
"knew there was a problem" and believed that "something had 
happened that was improper." (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 120-121). 
Browers next argue they had no reason to know that Mrs. 
Brower's thigh injury may have resulted from someone's negligence 
until she consulted Dr. Bever and Dr. Pandya on July, 1981. Mrs. 
Browerfs account of her conversations with these doctors, 
however, contains only a passing reference to the thigh injury. 
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gynecological/surgical procedures and follow up care. The record 
below contains no indication that any new facts about the thigh 
injury came to light as a result of Mrs. Brower's consultations 
with these doctors. Browers had as much knowledge about this 
injury on October 22, 1980, the day of Saundra Brower's surgery, 
as they did in July, 1981. 
In a related argument, Browers contend that the statute 
of limitations should not begin to run until a plaintiff has been 
told by a medical expert that he or she has a cause of action. 
Browers suggest that the statute should not run against a lay 
person, who has not consulted an.expert, unless the injury is 
catastrophic. Browers fail to explain what is meant by 
"catastrophic" or why this Court should adopt such a rule. 
Browers1 brief, however, implies that unless the negligence 
associated with an injury is obvious, the statute of limitations 
should not run until a plaintiff has conferred with medical 
experts. As discussed above, the standard established by the 
legislature and by this Court in Foil is contrary. The statute 
of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff knows or should 
know of an injury and the possibility of a negligent cause. 
The central reasoning behind the Foil decision was to 
encourage a potential claimant to diligently move forward and 
-12-
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the injury and the possibility of negligence. Such diligence is 
not encouraged if the claimant can casually wait for expert 
confirmation of his claims or negligence before the statute 
begins to run. As noted in Dawson v. Eli Lilly and Co., 543 F. 
Supp. 1330, 1334f (D.D.C. 1982) (emphasis in the original): 
If the statute of limitations did not 
begin to run merely because a plaintiff 
who knew of a possible cause relationship 
and did not rely on any representations 
to the contrary did not have certain 
knowledge of causation, no claim or 
causation which could be disputed 
would ever accrue. 
See also Duncan v. Augter, 661 P.2d 83, 86 (Or. App. 1983) 
(holding that the statute of limitations begins to run in medical 
malpractice actions when the plaintiff knows "facts from which a 
reasonable fact finder could conclude that the plaintiff's injury 
was caused by an act of the defendant that was somehow 
negligent." emphasis added) 
In Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court applied the Foil rule in a manner consistent with 
Dawson and Duncan. The claimant in Hove received anesthetic 
injections while having her teeth filled. During the injection 
she felt "an unusual" or "different" shock in her face and in the 
ensuing months she had a tingling sensation in the area of the 
injection. One year later she consulted a neurologist who told 
i 
* 
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her that the injection was a possible cause of her pain. Three 
years after the treatment she was examined by another neurologist 
who told her that her pain was definitely caused by the 
injection* The action was filed a few months later. 
This Court affirmed dismissal of the action based on a 
finding that discovery occurred more than two years before the 
action was filed. This Court explained that before the plaintiff 
consulted the first neurologist, she was "expected to have 
recognized the possibility that the recurring discomforts were 
the result of the injection..." Id. at 696 (emphasis added). 
Hove confirms that the rule in Foil only requires the claimant to 
have general knowledge of the negligence and possible causation 
aspects of the injury for the medical malpractice statute of 
limitations to begin running and that there is no requirement 
that the injury be catastrophic or that the plaintiff have expert 
advice. 
Finally, Browers argue the propriety of not allowing a 
separate trial on the issue of the statute of limitations under 
U.C.A. §78-12-47. Initially, this is an improper argument in 
that it is raised for the first time on appeal and had absolutely 
nothing to do with Judge Sorensen's decision. Secondly, in 
Reiser v. Lohner, supra, this Court clearly held that the statute 
-14-
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of limitations issue is subject to summary judgment when no 
genuine issues of material fact are raised. _Id_. at 100. 
By their own uncontradicted admissions, Browers were 
aware, on October 22, 1980f that Mrs. Brower had been injured 
while in the recovery roomf that this injury was not related to 
her hysterectomy, and that "something had happened that was im-
proper". (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 121). As the District Court 
Judge who initially ruled on defendant's motion for summary 
judgment in Reiser v. Lohnerf supra, Judge Sorensen is very 
familiar with this area of the law and his ruling that this 
action was not commenced within two years, as required by Utah 
Code Ann. §78-14-4, was based upon substantial evidence and 
should be affirmed. Hove v. McMaster, supra at 696. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was enacted for 
the purpose of limiting malpractice claims of individuals who 
through delay, neglect or mere inattention fail to bring their 
claims witin two years following the discovery of the existence 
of a potential claim. Browers, in this case, had over two years 
in which to commence an action against the hospital but failed to 
do so. Judge Sorensen's order dismissing this action with 
prejudice should be upheld. 
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Respectfully submitted this /^"^day of September, 
1985, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
KIRTON, 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent I ./fl.C^ Hospitals Inc. 
a corporatioru-affd I.H.C. 
Hospitals Inc., a corporation 
doing business as Valley View 
Medical Center 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SAUNDRA BROWER and 
FRANK OSCAR BROWER, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
DR. DAVID W. BROWN and 
I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC., 
a corporation, and 
I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC., 
a corporation doing business as 
VALLEY VIEW MEDICAL CENTER, 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 10201 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant I.H.C. HOSPITA4S( 
INC., a corporation, and I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC., a corporation 
doing business as VALLEY VIEW MEDICAL CENTER (hereinafter referred 
to as "Hospital"), having come on for argument before the Honorabl^ 
Allen B. Sorensen, the hospital being represented by Charles W. 
Dahlquist, II, Defendant Dr. David W. Brown being represented by 
Jody K. Burnett, and Plaintiffs being represented by Russell A. 
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Cannon, the Court having heard full argument on the matter and 
being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Defendant Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted; Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment having 
been fully considered by and argued before the Court is hereby 
denied; and Plaintiffs' action against Defendant Hospital is hereby) 
dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear their own costs. 
DATED this tS^ \ day of ^ r < ^ , 198 
BY THE COURT: 
^ ^ K ^ A H ^ O 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN, District Judge Ret, 
-2-
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SAUNDRA BROWER and 
FRANK OSCAR BROWER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DR DAVID W, BROWN, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT DENYING PLAINTIFFS1 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 1020X 
The motions for partial summary judgment of plaintiffs as 
against each of the Defendants respectively, having come on 
regularly for hearing December 19, 1984, before the above entitled 
court, Russell A. Cannon appearing for Plaintiffs, Charles 
Dahlquist appearing for Defendant I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc. dba 
Valley View Medical Center, and Jody K. Burnett appearing for 
Defendant Dr. David W. Brown; and the court having reviewed the 
pleadings and memoranda on file herein, and having heard the 
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arguments of counsel, and the court being fully advised m the 
premises, good cause appearing therefore, and this court finding 
and determining there is no just cause for delay of the appeal, 
it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs1 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as against Defendant Dr. 
David W. Brown, is denied; that Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment against Defendant I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., a 
corporation, dba Valley View Medical Center, is hereby denied. 
There is no just cause for delay of this appeal as to both of 
said Orders and Judgments denying Plaintiffs' respective Motions 
for Partial Summary Judgment, and it is hereby ordered that the 
same and each of them be entered as final judgments. Each 
party shall bear its own costs. 
Dated this A I day of ^ O K J - - , 1985 
BY THE COURT 
C^^i '^hx/^^ajy r^v 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN 
District Judge, Retired 
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Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, U.C,A. §78-14-4 and 8 
78-14-4. Sutute of limitations — Exceptions — Application. (1) No mal-
practice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is com-
menced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence, except that 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that 
a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shall 
be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence 
of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; 
and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from dis-
covering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care 
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the 
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discov-
ered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minor-
ity or other legal disability under section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the 
law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and cor-
porations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against 
health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior 
to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that any action which under 
former law could have been commenced after the effective date of this act may 
be commenced only within the unelapsed portion of time allowed under former law; 
but any action which under former law could have been commenced more than four 
years after the effective date of this act may l>e commenced only within four years 
after the effective date of this act 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. No malpractice action against 
a health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the pro-
spective defendant or his executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice 1 
of intent to commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of 
the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place of the occur- I 
rence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of I 
the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages 1 
sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or I 
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the man- I 
ner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons J 
and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, in I 
which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the date of mailing. Such I 
notice shall be served within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action I 
against a health care provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior I 
to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the mal- J 
practice action against the health care provider shall be extended to 120 days from I 
the date of service of notice. 1 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed I 
as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, and shall f 
apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 19 1976. This section shall ] 
not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a health care I 
provider. I 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56 
Rule 56. Summary Judgment. 
(a) For Claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 
days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day 
of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting 
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise pro-
vided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of 
a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
I court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be 
adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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